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Abs t rac t 
Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, 
some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at 
a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a 
standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a 
game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and 
are valid for games of strategic complementarities. 
Keywords: Comparative statics; Computing equilibria; Strategic complementarities; Supermodular games 
1. Introduction 
In a parameterized model we often want to know how an equilibrium changes if we 
change the parameter. If the parameter space is a partially ordered set and the state 
space or the decision space is also a partially ordered set, we often want to know 
when raising the parameter increases the equilibrium. In economics, some models in 
this framework arise as games of strategic complementarities (as defined in Milgrom and 
Shannon (1994)). These games include supermodular games (as defined in Topkis (1979), 
in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and in Vives (1990)). Classes of such games are games 
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of coordination (for example, games of macroeconomic coordination failure and games 
of network externalities) and games of industry behavior (for example, games of Bertrand 
Oligopoly when the products of the firms are substitutes). For other examples, see Milgrom 
and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1998), and Vives (1999). 
For these types of models, some of the results in the recent literature on monotone 
comparative statics give us conditions from which we can conclude that if a parameter 
increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. For example, Lippman 
et al. (1987) show that there is an old equilibrium that is smaller than some new 
equilibrium. In a more general framework, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Sobel (1988) 
show that the smallest old equilibrium is smaller than the smallest new equilibrium and the 
largest old equilibrium is smaller than the largest new equilibrium. Milgrom and Shannon 
(1994) prove the same result in an even more general framework. But we may not be 
able to say that a given equilibrium at a lower parameter value is smaller than another 
given equilibrium at a higher parameter value. In the absence of a widely accepted theory 
of equilibrium selection, one way to unambiguously determine that an old equilibrium 
is smaller than a new equilibrium is if every old equilibrium is smaller than every new 
equilibrium. In this paper, we give a sufficient condition which, when satisfied at a higher 
parameter value, allows us to conclude that every old equilibrium is smaller than every new 
equilibrium. We also give an algorithm to compute a minimal such higher parameter value 
and as an example, apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results 
are independent of any theory of equilibrium selection and apply to games of strategic 
complementarities. 
In the next section, we formalize the concepts and prove the results mentioned above. In 
the last section, we give an application of the algorithm for a game of network externalities. 
2. Model and results 
In this section, we first formalize a notion of a parameterized model and an equilibrium 
in it. Then we provide a sufficient condition to conclude that at a higher parameter value, 
every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. Finally, we provide an 
algorithm to compute an approximation to a minimal such higher parameter value. 
The notion of a parameterized model that we use is formalized in the definition of 
an increasing family of correspondences given below. For a given parameter value, an 
equilibrium in this model is a fixed point of the section of the correspondence determined 
by the given parameter value. 
Let X be a partially ordered set and A, B be two subsets of X. We shall say that A is 
weakly smaller than B if for every a e A there is b e B with a < b and for every b e B 
there is a e A with a < b. A correspondence 0 : X -» X is weakly increasing if for every 
J C , x' e X, x < x' implies that <f>(x) is weakly smaller than (j){xf). We shall say that A is 
strongly smaller than B if for every a e A and every b e B, a <b. Notice that if A has a 
largest element a and B has a smallest element b then A is strongly smaller than B if and 
only if a <b. 
For the sake of completeness, let us also define some preliminary concepts. A detailed 
discussion of these concepts can be found in Topkis (1998). A partially ordered set X is 
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a lattice if whenever i j g I , both x Ay — inf{x, y} and x v y = sup{x, y} exist in X. It is 
complete if for every nonempty subset A of X, inf A, sup A exist in X. A nonempty subset 
A of X is a sublattice if for all jc, y e A, jc Ax y, x Vx y e A, where i A x j and jc Vx y 
are obtained taking the infimum and supremum as elements of X (as opposed to using the 
relative order on A). A nonempty subset A c X is subcomplete if B c A, B ^ 0 implies 
infx 5 , sup x 5 e A, again taking inf and sup of B as a subset of X. 
Now, suppose X is a complete lattice and T a partially ordered set. An increasing family 
of correspondences, denoted (fa: t e T), is a correspondence 0 : X x T -» X such that (1) 
for every t, the correspondence x i-> fa (x) is weakly increasing, upper hemicontinuous and 
subcomplete sublattice valued and (2) for every x, the correspondence t h> fa (x) is weakly 
increasing. For each t, the equilibrium set at t is £(t) = {x e X: x e fa (jc)}, the set of fixed 
points of fa. For example, in games of strategic complementarities, the product of the best 
response correspondences of the players is an increasing family of correspondences and for 
a given parameter value, the set of Nash equilibria in the game is the set of fixed points of 
the section of the correspondence determined by this parameter value. (See Topkis (1998, 
Lemma 4.2.2) and Echenique (2002, Lemma 1).) 
For a given parameter value, we are interested in higher parameter values such that the 
equilibrium set at the given parameter value is strongly smaller than the equilibrium set at 
the higher parameter value. For notational convenience, we use the following definition for 
these higher parameter values. Let (fa: t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences 
and to eT. At eT with to < i is large enough for to if £(to) is strongly smaller than £(i). 
As, for every f, the equilibrium set is a complete lattice (by Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.5.1), 
for each t, £(t) is a complete lattice), £(to) is strongly smaller than £(t) if and only if 
sup£(to) -< inf£(i). The following theorem tells us when a i is large enough for to. 
Theorem. Let (fa: t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences, to e T, e_ — 
inf£ (to), and e — swp£(to). For every i eT with to < i, ife < infcp^e) then i is large 
enough for to. Also, ifi is large enough for to then so is every t' eT such that i < f. 
Proof. Using a slightly generalized version of Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.5.2)—see the 
lemma in Appendix A—we can say that if to < i then e_ < mf£ (i). As the correspondence 
x \-> fa(x) is weakly increasing, we have inf0r-(^_) < inf0 r-(inf£(f)). As £(t) is a 
complete lattice, we have mi£(i) e fa(inf£(i)) and therefore, inf0^(inf£(?)) < inf£(?). 
We conclude that if e •< inf'fa(e) then e < inf0f(inf£(f)) < inf£(i) so that i is large 
enough for to. Applying the lemma in Appendix A once more, we conclude that for every 
f e T, if i < f then sup£(to) < inf£(?) < inf£(tf) so that tf is large enough for to. • 
In Fig. 1, we highlight the condition given in this theorem. Figure 1 has three sections 
of an increasing family of correspondences, determined at to < tf < i. These sections are 
singleton-valued. The equilibrium set at to consists of three points where fa0 intersects the 
diagonal. The smallest equilibrium is labeled e and the largest equilibrium is labeled e. 
From the figure we can see that the condition in the theorem is satisfied for i so that i is 
large enough for to whereas it is not satisfied for tf and t! is not large enough for to. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present a computational alternative to the theorem 
that helps us compute a i large enough for to. When T is an order interval, and this is 
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Fig. 1. £ is large enough for to-
the case on which we shall focus in the rest of this paper, there is a distinguished value 
such that for each given value, if this distinguished value is not large enough for the given 
value then there is no point in T that is large enough for the given value. Formally, suppose 
T = [i,t] = {t e T \ i < t < t}, (0*: t e T) is an increasing family of correspondences 
and to eT. Then it is obvious that there exists at eT large enough for to if and only if t 
is large enough for ^o-1 Therefore, in this case, to determine if there is a point in T large 
enough for to we need only determine if the largest point in T is large enough for to. We 
can do this by using the following algorithm. 
Algorithm 1 (Topkis, 1979). Let t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences 
and t eT. Fix x e X. 
1. Set k = 0 andxo—x. 
2. If 0f(jcfc) has a smallest element set Xk+\ = infQfak) and go to next step. Else stop. 
3. Set k = k + 1. Return to step 2 and continue. 
1 It is easy to generalize this condition to the case where T is an arbitrary partially ordered set with sup T eT. 
In this case, there exists £ e T large enough for to if and only if sup T is large enough for to. 
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From Topkis (1998, Theorem 4.3.3) we know that if (fa: t e T) is an increasing family 
of correspondences, i e T9 x = infX then the sequence (xk) generated by Algorithm 1 
converges to inf £(?). Also, if we let i — to, x = sup X and in step 2 of Algorithm 1 change 
the word smallest to largest and inf to sup then the sequence generated by this modified 
algorithm converges to sup£(7o). Thus, given two points to and i in T with to •< i we can 
determine whether i is large enough for to or not. In particular, when T = [t_, t] we can 
determine if there is a point in T large enough for to by determining if t is large enough 
for to. 
Once we know that t is large enough for to, we can invoke any of a number of algorithms 
to determine a minimal t that is large enough for to. We present one such algorithm. Our 
algorithm is slightly different from one that invokes Algorithm 1 in a standard way (that 
is, by using Topkis (1998, Theorem 4.3.3)). We use some of the information computed in 
earlier iterations whereas applying Algorithm 1 in a standard way does not. Elementary 
versions of our algorithm occur frequently in numerical analysis. For example, see Press 
et al. (1989, Section 3.4). 
Algorithm 2. Let (fa: t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences and to e T = 
[I, t] c Using Algorithm 1, set e = inf£ (to) and e = sup £ (to). Fix a convergence 
criterion, e > 0. Let K ^ 1 be such that 1/2* < e. 
1. Set k — 0, l 0 — to, to = U and e0 = e. 
2. Set 4+i =t_k + \(ik-t_k). ^ 
3. Using Algorithm 1 with t = 4+i and x = ek, set e_k+x = mf£(4+i). 
4. If ^ ^ set = r^, 4+1 = 4+1 > and = and go to next step. Else set 
t_k+x = 4+1 and 4+1 = 4 and go to next step. 
5. If k ^ K — 1 set ^ = k + 1, return to step 2 and continue. Else stop. 
This algorithm searches for the smallest point in the line segment from to to t that 
is large enough for to? It does this by dividing this line segment into halves and using 
Algorithm 1, testing whether the highest point in the lower half is large enough for to or 
not. If it is then the algorithm changes the starting point in Algorithm 1 and proceeds to 
divide the lower half into halves and repeats the loop. Otherwise it does not change the 
starting point in Algorithm 1, divides the upper half into halves and repeats the loop. 
In this algorithm a standard way to invoke Algorithm 1 is to use Theorem 4.3.3 in 
Topkis (1998) and always start Algorithm 1 from x = inf X. This does not use information 
computed in earlier iterations. We use this information by starting Algorithm 1 at an earlier 
minimal fixed point. This can make our algorithm better than the one constructed in a 
standard way. 
It is obvious that the sequences (t_k) and (4) generated by this algorithm are 
respectively, weakly increasing and weakly decreasing. It is easy to see that for every k, 
t_k ^ 4 and 4+1 — t k + x — \ (tk — t_k) (and hence tk — t_k — ^(t — to)). It is also easy to 
see that if t is large enough for to then for every k, 4 is large enough for to and if to is not 
2 The line segment from to to t is the convex hull of these two points. 
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large enough for to then for every k,t_k\s not large enough for to. Each of these statements 
can be proved easily using induction. 
Recall that if I is not large enough for to then there is no point in T that is large enough 
for to. Also, if to is large enough for to 3 then to is a minimal parameter value large enough 
for to. When either of these conditions hold, we do not need the algorithm given above. 
When neither of these conditions holds, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition. Let (fa: t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences and to e T = 
[f, t\ c dlm. Suppose I is large enough for to and to is not large enough for to. Then, 
(1) for every € > 0, there is i eT such that i is large enough for to and i — e(t — to) is not 
large enough for to, and 
(2) the sequences generated by Algorithm 2 converge to the infimum of those points in the 
line segment from to to I that are large enough for to. 
Proof. To prove the first statement fix e > 0, let K, IK and t_K be as in the previous 
algorithm and let i = IK. We know that IK is large enough for to and t_K is not large 
enough for to. Also, t — e(I — to) < IK — JK(I — to) = t_K so that if t — e(I — to) is large 
enough for to then so is t_K, a contradiction. To prove the second statement, notice that if 
we do not stop Algorithm 2 after finitely many steps, we get a weakly increasing sequence 
(lk) that is bounded above (by I) and a weakly decreasing sequence (Ik) that is bounded 
below (by to) and hence both these sequences converge. Also, for every k, t_k ^ 4 and 
Ik — t_k = ^j- (I — to), so that both the sequences converge to the same point, say t*. Suppose 
there is a point i in the line segment from to to I that is large enough for to. If i < t* then 
for some k sufficiently large, t < t_k so that t_k is large enough for to, a contradiction. 
Therefore, t* ^ t and is a lower bound. The convergence of 4 to t* implies that t* is a 
greatest lower bound. • 
A corollary of this proposition is that if there is a point in the line segment from to to I 
that is the lowest element in this line segment that is large enough for to then the sequences 
generated by Algorithm 2 converge to this point. 
3 . Example 
As an application of Algorithm 2 we perform a comparative statics analysis of a version 
of Farrell and Saloner's (1985) game of network externalities. In this game there are two 
agents, indexed i — 1,2. Each agent chooses a degree or probability of adoption of a 
new technological standard and depending on a parameter, is subsidized for technology 
3 This happens when £(to) is singleton-valued. 
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adoption. Formally, agent i chooses a number x\ from the unit interval [0, 1] and for a 
subsidy level t G [0, 1], gets a payoff of tx\. Agent 1 's payoff is given by 
u\(x\9xr, t)=2x\X2 + tx\ + 2x\ ^X2 - -x\ + ^ [ l o g ( x i ) + log(l -x\)]. 
The first term reflects the fact that the gain to agent 1 is higher when agent 2 adopts more 
of the technology, the second term is agent l's subsidy, the third term shows that the gain 
is increased more when agent 2 adopts a higher technological standard, the fourth term is 
a quadratic cost of technology adoption and the term in brackets prevents corner solutions. 
This functional form, especially the third term, helps us obtain multiple equilibria in a 
simple way. Agent 2's payoff is given symmetrically, that is U2(x\, X2\ t) = u\ (x2, x\; t). 
A model with incomplete information will yield our example as a reduced form. 
It is easy to see that this is a supermodular game parameterized by t e T = [0, I] c$i. 
Suppose the current level of the subsidy is to = 0.15 and we want to find out if increasing 
the subsidy will increase the equilibrium. (Notice that an increase in the equilibrium 
choices of the agents implies a Pareto improvement over the old equilibrium.) We want 
to know what the new level of subsidy must be so that we can unambiguously conclude 
that both agents are better off. That is, we want to find a t large enough for to. 
Note that all extremal equilibria are symmetric. Using Algorithm 1, we find that 
inf£(fo) = (0.06,0.06) and sup£(*o) = (0.88,0.88). Using Algorithm 2 with K = 5 
we obtain, at i = 0.81, inf£(0.81) = (0.94, 0.94). There is no significant improvement 
even after increasing the number of iterations to K — 20 so we conclude that with a 
relatively small number of iterations (K = 5) the performance of Algorithm 2 is good. 
The C programming code for these computations is available from the authors on request. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we prove a lemma that is a slightly generalized version of Theorem 2.5.2 in Topkis (1998). 
We want to prove this version because our definition of an increasing family of correspondences is weaker than 
the one given in Topkis (1998).4 
Lemma. Let (fa: t e T) be an increasing family of correspondences. For every t,t' e T, if t < tf then 
inf£(r) < inf^(^) andsup£(0 < sup£(tf). 
4 In Topkis (1998) the section x \-> <pt (x) is increasing in the strong set order. We only assume it increasing in 
the weak set order. 
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Proof. By Theorem 2.5.1 in Topkis (1998), we know that S(t) is a complete lattice and sup £(7) = sup{x e X: 
<t>T(X) Pi [x ,supX] 7̂  0}. Thus, sup£(0 e </>^(sup£(0) and hence SWP£(t) ^ sup <̂  (sup £(£))• As the corre-
spondence t \-> <J>T(X) is weakly increasing, we have sup^(sup£( f ) ) •< sup <ptr (sup S(t)) E </y (sup£(0) so that 
</y (sup£(0) D [sup£(0, sup XI 7̂  0. Thus, sup£(0 E {X E X: 4>TF(X) Pi [x, sup XI ^ 0} and hence sup£(0 < 
sup£(^)- The result for inf£(0 follows analogously. • 
References 
Echenique, F., 2002. Comparative statics by adaptive dynamics and the correspondence principle. Economet-
rica 70 (2), 257-289. 
Farrell, J., Saloner, G., 1985. Standardization, compatibility and innovation. RAND J. Econ. 16 (1), 70-83. 
Lippman, S.A., Mamer, J.W., McCardle, K.F., 1987. Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via 
transfinitely iterated play. J. Econ. Theory 41 (2), 288-303. 
Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1990. Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementar-
ities. Econometrica 58 (6), 1255-1277. 
Milgrom, R, Shannon, C , 1994. Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62 (1), 157-180. 
Press, W.H., Flannery, B.P., Teukolsky, S.A, Vetterling, W.T., 1989. Numerical Recipes in C. Cambridge Univ. 
Press. 
Sobel, M.J., 1988. Isotone comparative statics in supermodular games. Mimeo. SUNY at Stony Brooks. 
Topkis, D.M., 1979. Equilibrium points in nonzero-sum ^-person submodular games. SIAM J. Control 
Optim. 17(6), 773-787. 
Topkis, D.M., 1998. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton Univ. Press. 
Vives, X., 1990. Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities. J. Math. Econ. 19 (3), 305-321. 
Vives, X., 1999. Oligopoly Pricing. MIT Press. 
Echenique, Federico and Tarun Sabarwal (2003): “Strong Comparative Statics of Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 
42(2), Feb., 307-314.  Publisher's Offical Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00548-1.   
Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
9
